Abstract. We consider the incentives of a single …rm to invest in a cleaner technology under emission quotas and emission taxation. We assume asymmetric information about the …rm's cost of employing the new technology. Policy is set either before the …rm invests (commitment) or after (time consistency). Contrary to conventional wisdom, we …nd that with commitment (time consistency), quotas give higher (lower) investment incentives than taxes. With quotas (taxes), commitment generally leads to higher (lower) welfare than time consistency. Under commitment with quadratic abatement costs and environmental damages, a modi…ed Weitzman rule applies and quotas usually lead to higher welfare than taxes. 
Introduction
Which environmental policy instrument gives the highest incentives to develop and adopt cleaner technologies? Which environmental policy instrument is best able to deal with asymmetric information about abatement costs of newly introduced production techniques? Should environmental policy be set before the …rms have chosen their abatement technology (commitment) or afterward (time consistency)? These are among the most crucial and widely analyzed issues in environmental policy. To the best of our knowledge, however, so far only D' Amato and Dijkstra (2015) have addressed all three questions together, and only under the assumption of non-strategic …rms. In this paper, we extend the analysis to strategic …rm behaviour.
We model the technology adoption choice by a single polluting …rm which is subject to regulation through price-based or quantity-based controls. Environmental regulation of a single …rm, with increasing marginal damage of pollution, may seem unrealistic. One could think of a large polluter by a small lake, or on a small island. More importantly, this is the simplest setup that allows us to study a strategic regulatory environment, where one …rm's decisions make a large di¤erence to the aggregate outcome. This is the polar opposite of D'Amato and Dijkstra's (2015) multi-…rm industry. Regulation of an industry with several large …rms, the more realistic case that falls in between the two extremes, can be studied next. We will assume increasing marginal damage to allow for a non-trivial comparison between taxation and emission quotas. If marginal damage were constant, the regulator would always be able to implement the …rst best with taxation (under commitment and time consistency) by setting the tax rate equal to marginal damage.
We …nd that with emission quotas, except for very speci…c …xed costs ranges, commitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency, as the former generates larger incentives to invest than the latter. Indeed, time consistency under emission quotas effectively punishes investment, because it results in a lower quota. Surprisingly, under time consistency the regulator does not gain much from the information learnt from the …rm's investment decision. Conclusions are reversed when dealing with emission taxes: time consistency is shown to yield higher welfare in most of the …xed costs ranges under scrutiny; this can be explained accountig for the larger incentives to invest taxation provides. Finally, we also compare quotas and taxes for quadratic abatement cost and damage functions. Concerning commitment, we …nd that quotas yield, in most of the scenarios concerning …xed costs, higher welfare than taxes. However, we cannot rank the instruments for the time consistency scenario.
Our analysis is linked to several strands of the literature. Since Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989) , an attempt has been made to compare the relative merits of di¤erent environmental policy instruments in terms of their incentives for R&D into and adoption of new abatement technologies. This literature has been surveyed by Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a) . Weitzman (1974) was the …rst to systematically address the relative performance of price and quantity regulation under uncertainty in environmental policy or indeed any area of policy.
2 Moledina et al. (2003) compare taxes and tradable permits with grandfathering in a two-…rm industry. The regulator does not know the …rms'abatement cost and does not take into account that the …rms will try to manipulate her beliefs and policy. The authors show that …rms will underabate under taxation in order to obtain a lower tax rate. The result for tradable permits is less clearcut. On one hand, both …rms bene…t from a high permit price, because this will prompt the regulator to issue more permits. On the other hand, the permit buyer (seller) prefers a low (high) permit price.
The literature on the timing of government policy, starting with Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980) , has almost unanimously found that with perfect information, commitment is always at least as good as time consistency. This result has been challenged by several papers on environmental policy (Amacher and Malik, 2002; Arguedas and Hamoudi, 2004; Requate, 2005b; Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2015) .
Let us now consider papers that combine at least two of the three issues just reviewed.
Combining innovation and policy timing, Unold (2001, 2003) study the case where the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the number of tradable emission permits either before (commitment) or after (time consistency) the many small …rms in the industry have chosen between the conventional and a new abatement technology. Both instruments yield the …rst best in both scenarios when …rms are heterogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2001) , but commitment to a tax rate does not always yield the …rst best when …rms are homogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2003) . Amacher and Malik (2002) also compare commitment and time consistency, but only for emission taxation of a single …rm choosing its abatement technology. They show that welfare may be higher with time consistency. Amacher and Malik (2001) show that unlike emission taxation, an emission quota always implements the …rst best with commitment.
Our paper builds on Amacher and Malik (2002) to include asymmetric information. We …nd that with taxation, time consistency usually yields higher welfare. Due to asymmetric 2 Recent papers in this vein include Coria and Hennlock (2012) , who focus on policy reactions to technological development in the presence of transaction and political costs and Ambec and Coria (2013) who analyze the control of two pollutants with asymmetric information about their interdependent abatement costs. Goodkind and Coggins (2015) take corner solutions into account. In a two-country model, Weitzel (2017) analyses how an abatement cost shock in one country a¤ects both countries. information, commitment does not implement the …rst best with an emission quota, and time consistency can yield higher welfare in this case as well.
Combining asymmetric information and innovation, Mendelsohn (1984) , Krysiak (2008) and Storrøsten (2014) examine the choice between price and quantity instruments under commitment. In all three papers, technology choice is continuous: A …rm can invest to reduce the intercept and (in Krysiak (2008) and Storrøsten (2014) ) the slope of its Marginal Abatement Cost (M AC) curve. Mendelsohn (1984) considers a single …rm, with asymmetric information about marginal abatement costs and investment costs. Krysiak (2008) models an industry with many ex-ante identical small …rms who discover their marginal abatement costs after their investment decision. Storrøsten (2014) adds product demand uncertainty to this. All three papers …nd that endogenous technical change reduces the slope of the long-run M AC curve, making quantity regulation more attractive. In our paper, with linear M AC and marginal environmental damage functions, we also …nd that quotas are generally better than taxes under commitment. This is because quotas o¤er higher investment incentives, and the M AC curve is relatively ‡at. Yao (1988) assumes that asymmetric information concerns the …rms' innovation capacity. The game consists of two periods and involves a single player (the "industry"). In period one, the regulator sets the period-one emission standard. Then industry chooses a research investment level. The game is repeated in period two. Yao (1988) …nds that the industry underinvests in period 1 in an attempt to reduce the regulator's con…dence in its ability and to obtain a more lenient standard in period 2. The regulator partially counteracts this e¤ect by setting a stricter standard in period 1.
Finally, we shall discuss three papers that combine all three elements of innovation, uncertainty and policy timing. Malik (1991) compares commitment and time consistency for quota setting for a single …rm in a two-period model where the period-2 damage function is revealed in period 2. The advantage of time consistency is that the regulator has perfect information when she sets the quotas. The disadvantage is that the …rm underinvests in abatement capital in period 1 to obtain a more lenient period-2 quota. Tarui and Polasky (2005) study a simpli…ed version of Malik's (1991) game with only a single period and without costly enforcement. However, they analyze taxes as well as quotas. Commitment would result in the …rst best if there were no uncertainty about damages, because the …rm has a continuous investment decision. With time consistency, the result is again that the …rm underinvests with quotas and overinvests with taxes.
When abatement costs and damages are quadratic, taxes are welfare-superior to quotas. D'Amato and Dijkstra (2015) introduce asymmetric information into the Unold (2001, 2003) model discussed above: Firms di¤er in their …xed costs of adopting the new abatement technology, but all …rms in the industry either have high or low variable cost of using the new technology. The cost realization is revealed to the …rms, but not to the regulator. Time consistency allows the regulator to infer the cost realization both with emission taxation and with tradable permits, and to implement the …rst best, as with complete information (Requate and Unold, 2001) . However, unlike with complete information, the regulator cannot implement the …rst best with commitment. In this case, the welfare comparison follows a modi…ed Weitzman (1974) rule: Tradable permits lead to higher welfare than emission taxation if the weighted slope of the M AC curve is ‡atter than the Marginal Environmental Damage curve. Intriguingly, the slope of the high-cost M AC is weighted with the probability that the costs are low, and vice versa.
We apply D' Amato and Dijkstra's (2015) model to the regulation of a single …rm. The game structure in our paper is also close to Tarui and Polasky (2005) , but uncertainty enters in the form of asymmetric information on abatement costs, as in Moledina et al. (2003) . Unlike Moledina et al. (2003) , we assume the regulator realizes that the …rm may try to manipulate her beliefs and policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the main structure of the model. In Section 3 we compare commitment and time consistency with quotas. In Section 4 we do the same for emission taxation. In Section 5 we compare quotas and emission taxation. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We model the behaviour of a single polluting …rm, currently using abatement technology 1 with no …xed cost and variable cost C(a); where a is the abatement level. high ( = h); implying that the …rm is ine¢ cient in using the new technology, low ( = l); implying that the …rm is e¢ cient in using the new technology.
Parameter is known by the regulated …rm, while the regulator only knows its a priori distribution, according to which = h with probability p 2 (0; 1) and = l with probability 1 p. By de…nition, l < h < 1; implying that for both types of …rm, the new technology has lower variable and marginal cost than the existing technology: We can say that there are three technologies ( = l; h; 1) and the …rm of type (or …rm for short)
can choose between technologies 1 and ; = l; h:
The cost function satis…es C 0 (0) = 0; C 0 (a) > 0 for a > 0; and C 00 (a) > 0: An example is given in Figure 1 with marginal abatement costs M AC 1 for the current technology and Figure 1 is an example of a marginal environmental damage curve:
The objective of the environmental regulator is to minimize social costs. We assume that for all policy equilibria we consider, there is a unique interior cost minimum, and the second order conditions hold globally.
(Variable) Social Costs (V )SC for technology ( = l; h; 1) are:
with F 1 = 0 and F = F > 0 for = h; l: The socially optimal abatement level a is implicitly de…ned by the …rst order condition:
3 We abstract from the possibility that technological change increases M AC for high levels of abatement (Amir et al. (2008) , Bauman et al. (2008) , Bréchet and Jouvet (2008) , Perino and Requate (2012) ). 4 All …gures in this paper assume that marginal abatement costs and marginal environmental damage are linear in abatement. However, our formal analysis is not limited to this case. The M AC and M ED curves in the …gures are drawn for illustrative purposes and do not always satisfy all conditions we impose on them in the paper. In Figure 1 , social costs under technology 1, h and l are given by the areas OBe; OHe+ F and OLe + F respectively: Totally di¤erentiating (2) with respect to ; we …nd:
Thus, as we see in Figure 1 :
We de…ne F ( = h; l) as the level of …xed costs that equates social costs for the existing and the new technology at the optimal abatement levels a 1 for the existing technology and a ( = h; l) for new technology . From (1):
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to and applying (2) yields:
Since F h = 0 in (5) for h ! 1 and l < h < 1; this implies F l > F h > 0: In Figure 1 , In Figure 1 , suppose the linear M AC 1 is very steep. Then when is very low, the marginal abatement cost curve is almost horizontal and total abatement costs at the social optimum a are very low. When rises, total abatement costs at a also rise, until they reach a maximum at a = e=2: When rises above e=2; abatement costs start to decrease. When = 1, the marginal abatement cost curve is almost vertical and total abatement costs at a tend to zero again. Thus with quadratic abatement cost and environmental damage functions, abatement costs at the social optimum a are an inverse U-shaped function of : 6 This result holds for a large variety of other functional forms. In fact, we shall only consider functional forms for which it holds:
Assumption 1. The function C(a ); with 0 < < 1 and a de…ned by (2), is unimodal with the maximum denoted by =~ :
In the course of our analysis we shall make a number of additional assumptions intended to maximize the number of equilibria that can occur and to facilitate the presentation. 7 We prefer to introduce these assumptions when we have de…ned the relevant variables.
We analyze two environmental policy instruments in two policy regimes. The two environmental policy instruments are emission taxation and emission quotas. The emission quota speci…es the maximum allowed level of emissions. Since emissions are given by 5 Thus in our setting investment can never be larger than the socially optimal level. The issue of overinvestment is addressed in several papers, including Unold (2001, 2003) and Tarui and Polasky (2005) . 6 This can be seen as follows. Let C(a) = 1 2 a 2 and D(e a) = d 2 (e a) 2 ; making M AC and M ED linear in e. By (2), a solves a = d(e a); so that a = de=( + d) and
Maximizing this with respect to yields = d and thus a = e=2: (15) and (34), and Assumptions 2 and 3 in Appendix B.
the di¤erence between exogenous business-as-usual emissions and abatement, the emission quota translates straightforwardly into an abatement target. We shall use the terms "(emission) quota" and "(abatement) target" interchangeably. The two policy regimes we consider are commitment and time consistency, the di¤erence between them occurring in stages one and two of the game between the regulator and the …rm.
In stage zero of each game, nature draws the …rm's type : The type is revealed to the …rm, but not to the regulator. All other parameters are common knowledge.
Under commitment, the regulator sets the abatement target or the emission tax rate in stage one. In stage two, the …rm chooses a technology. This order is reversed under time consistency.
Finally, in stage three the …rm chooses its abatement level. With abatement targets, it simply complies with the target.
For these sequential games with incomplete information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is the standard equilibrium concept (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , section 8.2; Tadelis (2013) , Ch. 15). A PBE requires that each player is sequentially rational, i.e. at a given information set she takes the expected utility maximizing choice given her system of beliefs. A system of beliefs assigns a probability to each state of the world in each information set. In our game, it speci…es the probability that the regulator assigns to the …rm being of type h; given its investment decision. Beliefs have to be consistent, i.e. formed according to Bayes'rule. Under commitment, where the regulator cannot learn anything from the …rm's investment behaviour, the PBE reduces to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). For the sake of brevity, and where not needed to explain results, we will refer to the relevant equilibrium concept simply as "equilibrium".
Anticipating our analysis in the following sections, it is easily seen that (unlike in the Malik (2001, 2002 ) models with perfect information) the regulator cannot achieve the …rst best under any of these scenarios. Given that F < F h , the …rst best is for each type of …rm to invest and for type to abate a given by (2). It is clear from Figure 1 that …rm l has lower marginal environmental damage in this case and should be set a stricter target or a lower tax rate.
8 Under commitment however, the regulator has to set the same target or tax rate for both types. When both types invest under time consistency, the regulator cannot infer whether the …rm is of type h or l and will again have to set the same policy for both.
We can also establish:
9
Lemma 1 The regulator would be able to achieve the …rst best under commitment as well as time consistency, if she could verify the …rm's choice between the current and the new technology, and o¤er the …rm a contract. This contract would specify a payment T from the …rm to the regulator depending on the …rm's choice of abatement and (if necessary)
technology.
Though theoretically feasible, the …rst best contract implies the regulator can perfectly verify technology choice by the …rm and make lump sum transfers. In order to focus on realistic contracts, we shall assume in the following that the regulator cannot o¤er the …rm such a contract, either because the …rm's technology choice cannot be veri…ed, or because of constraints on the type of instrument that the regulator is allowed to use.
Emission quotas
In this section we establish the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for emission quotas under commitment (subsection 3.1) and time consistency (subsection 3.2), and compare the two policy regimes to each other (subsection 3.3). The emission quota speci…es the maximum allowed level of emissions. Alternatively, we can say that the regulator sets an abatement target specifying the minimum required level a of abatement.
Commitment
Under commitment, the regulator sets the emission quota in stage one before the …rm chooses whether to invest or not in stage two.
Starting the analysis in stage two, given that the regulator has set the abatement target at a and the …rm is of type ; the …rm invests if and only if F < F (a) where:
9 The proofs of all lemmas and of Propositions 4 and 6 are in Appendix A.
Since h > l we have
In stage one, the regulator can set the quota such that F < F h (a) and both types of …rm invest, F h (a) < F < F l (a) and only …rm l invests, or F > F l (a) and the …rm does not invest. Let us examine which quota the regulator would like to set in each of these scenarios.
If the regulator sets a such that F < F h (a); both types of …rm will invest. If both types of …rm are going to invest, the regulator would like to set the quota that mimimizes:
where
The optimal target a m is then implicitly de…ned by the …rst order condition:
It follows from (3) and h > m > l that:
In Figure 1 , the curve M AC m represents the LHS of …rst order condition (10) and
is given by the area OM e:
We …nd that:
Lemma 2 Both types of …rm will invest when the regulator has set a m : Figure 1 illustrates this lemma, which is equivalent to F < F h (a m ) as given by (7) and (10). In Figure 1 , F h (a m ) is area OW J; which exceeds the maximum value of F given by
If the regulator sets a such that F h (a) < F < F l (a); only …rm l will invest. If the …rm is only going to invest when it is of type l, the regulator would like to set the quota that minimizes:
The optimal target a 1l in this case is implicitly de…ned by the …rst order condition:
The following lemma shows that the regulator prefers a m with investment by both types to a 1l with investment by …rm l only:
by (12) and a 1l by (13):
The result follows from the assumption that investment is socially desirable for any …rm's type.
Finally, if the regulator sets a such that F > F l (a); the …rm will not invest. If the …rm is not going to invest, the regulator would like to set a 1 as de…ned in (2). We shall now see that the regulator prefers a m with investment by both types to a 1 without investment, which requires F < F m as de…ned by (5) and (9). It follows from (6) and m < h that
Since we have assumed that F < F h ; we also have F < F m : In Figure 1 , F m is given by the area OBM: Since F is assumed to be smaller than OBH; it is also smaller than OBM:
Thus we can conclude:
Proposition 1 Let the regulator set the abatement target a in stage one and let the …rm make its investment decision in stage two. In the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, in stage one the regulator sets a m ; given by (10), and in stage two the …rm invests, irrespective of its type.
Time consistency
With time consistency, the …rm decides in stage one whether or not to invest and the regulator sets the quota in stage two. If the …rm does not invest in stage one, the regulator will set the abatement target at a 1 given by (2) in stage two. In this case the …rm's type is irrelevant and we do not need to specify the regulator's beliefs. However, we do need to specify the regulator's beliefs about the …rm's type if it has invested.
Let us denote by q the regulator's posterior probability that the …rm is of type h given that it has invested in stage one: There are three possible equilibrium values for q which we shall discuss in the following three subsections. Subsection 3.2.4 concludes with a statement of all equilibria in this scenario.
Firm h invests
In the …rst case, the regulator believes that both types of …rm would have invested. Thus she does not learn anything when the …rm has invested: her posterior probability q that the …rm is of type h is the same as the prior probability p: In this case, the regulator sets the abatement target at a m given by (10) in stage two.
In stage one, if …rm anticipates that the regulator will set a m in (10) when it invests, it will invest for:
with a 1 given by (2). Since h > l, F 
Firm h does not invest
In the second case, the regulator believes that only …rm l would have invested. Now the regulator learns the …rm type when she sees that the …rm has invested: her posterior probability q that the …rm is of type h equals zero. In this case, the regulator sets the abatement target at a l de…ned by (2) in stage two.
10
In stage one, if …rm anticipates that the regulator will set a l in (2) when it invests, it will invest for:
As with
In Figure 1 , F h l is given by OBa 1 OY a l = OBG a 1 GY a l and F l l by OBa 1 OLa l = OBS a 1 SLa l : When F h l < F; type h will not invest, con…rming the regulator's beliefs. When F h l < F < F l l ; only type l will invest. When F l l < F; type l will not invest either. We shall assume F l l < F h in order to include the latter equilibrium. 10 We will assume that if the regulator believes neither type of …rm would have invested, she would set a l in the out-of-equilibrium event that the …rm did invest.
Firm h mixes
There is a third possible case, where the regulator believes that …rm l would always have invested and …rm h would have invested with probability 2 (0; 1): Upon investment, the regulator updates the probability that the …rm is of type h to q according to Bayes' rule (e.g. Tadelis (2013) , section 19.4.3):
In stage two, the regulator sets the quota to minimize expected variable social cost given by:
The …rst (second) term is the abatement cost of …rm h (l) multiplied by the probability that the investing …rm is a …rm of type h (l): The optimal target a r in this case is implicitly de…ned by the …rst order condition:
We see that r 2 (l; m) is increasing in 2 (0; 1); with m de…ned by (9): It then follows from (3) that a r is decreasing in and:
because l < r < m:
11
In stage one, if …rm h expects the regulator to set a r in (17); it will be indi¤erent between investing and not investing if:
As C 0 > 0; F r is decreasing in a r : It then follows from (18) that …rm h can be made indi¤erent between investing and not investing, con…rming the regulator's beliefs, for 11 There is no interval of F for which there is a mixed strategy PBE with …rm l randomizing and …rm h not investing. In this case, the regulator would set a l given by (2) after investment. Firm l would only be indi¤erent between investing and not investing for F = F We shall assume F h l > 0: Combined with Lemma 4 and our assumption that F l l < F h , this assures that we include all equilibria where …rm h invests with probability 2 (0; 1).
Equilibria
We know from the analysis above that the critical F values are F (14), there are three equilibria. In the …rst equilibrium, both types of …rm invest and the regulator sets a m : In the second equilibrium, only …rm l invests and the regulator sets a l ; given by (2), if the …rm has invested. Finally, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, …rm h invests with probability while …rm l always invests. If the …rm has invested, the regulator sets a r : The values of and a r as functions of F follow from (17) and (19): In each equilibrium, if the …rm does not invest, the regulator sets a 1 , given by (2):
We see that with emission quotas under time consistency, there are multiple equilibria, depending on …xed costs F . There is even a range of F where three equilibria overlap (Proposition 2.2). The …rm prefers the equilibrium with the most lenient target, i.e. where both types invest and the regulator sets a m . 12 One may wonder why the …rm, as the …rst mover, does not choose to play this equilibrium. The reason is that in a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, the …rm plays its best response to the regulator's system of beliefs, where the system of beliefs has to be consistent with the …rm's behaviour. The …rm does not get to choose the regulator's system of beliefs, only whether or not to invest.
Comparing commitment and time consistency
We can now compare the equilibrium outcomes under commitment and time consistency (Propositions 1 and 2 respectively) with respect to investment and expected social costs.
We see that under commitment, the regulator always sets a m and both types of …rm invest. With time consistency, this is only one of the four possible equilibria. In a way, investment is punished under time consistency, because it results in stricter targets.
Let us now consider welfare. For F h l < F < F h m ; there is a mixed strategy equilibrium under time consistency where …rm l always invests and …rm h invests with probability : Expected social cost is:
The second equality follows from (1) and (16). The third equality follows from (19).
Let us determine what happens to expected social cost as F rises from F (20):
The inequality follows from a r > a 1 (by (4) and (18)) and D 0 > 0: Thus, expected social costs in the mixed strategy equilibrium are decreasing in and (paradoxically) in F , and increasing in a r :
We can now compare expected social costs in the three time consistency equilibria (one of which is also the commitment equilibrium) in the interval F 2 F h l ; F h m : Starting at F h l with the commitment and time consistency equilibrium where both types invest (point V in Figure 2 ), expected social costs rise at the rate of F as we increase F towards point W: At W we change to the mixed strategy equilbrium. By (21), expected social costs rise as we move up, with decreasing from 1 to 0 and F decreasing, from W to X: At X we switch to the equilibrium where only …rm l invests. Increasing F from point X to Y raises expected social costs at the rate of (1 p)F: Thus expected social costs rise continually along the trajectory V W XY: It then follows that for given F; expected social costs are lowest in the commitment equilibrium and highest in the time consistency equilibrium where only …rm l invests, with the mixed strategy equilibrium in between.
For F 2 F h m ; F l l , the welfare comparison between commitment and time consistency is ambiguous. When F > F l l ; the …rm does not invest and abates a 1 in the time consistency equilibrium. As we have seen in subsection 3.1, welfare in this equilibrium is lower than in the commitment outcome with both types of …rm investing and abating a m . We can conclude:
Proposition 3 Comparing the commitment and time consistency equilibria under emission quotas:
1. Investment by both types of …rm always happens in the commitment equilibrium.
With time consistency, it occurs in the unique equilibrium for F < F We see that with emission quotas, in all cases where we can unambiguously sign the welfare di¤erence, commitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency (Proposition 3.3). This is because the investment incentive is higher under commitment. As we have seen, investment is punished under time consistency, because it results in stricter quotas.
The fact that in the time consistency scenario, the …rm's investment decision may reveal something about its type is not very helpful in this setup. In some equilibria, the …rm reveals that it is of type h by not investing. However, the regulator would generally prefer …rm h to invest.
Emission taxes
In this section we establish the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for emission taxation under commitment (subsection 4.2) and time consistency (subsection 4.3), and compare the two policy regimes to each other (subsection 4.4). But …rst, in subsection 4.1, we discuss some elements of the game that are common between commitment and time consistency: the …rm's choice of abatement in stage three, and the regulator's preferred tax rate for a given technology.
Preliminaries
In the third and …nal stage of the game, facing emission tax rate t, the …rm with technology ( = 1; h; l) minimizes the sum of abatement cost and tax payment C(a) + t(e a).
The …rst order condition, de…ning the cost-minimizing abatement level a (t); is:
Total di¤erentiation with respect to t yields:
The inequality follows from C 00 > 0: Thus abatement is increasing in the tax rate.
Totally di¤erentiating (22) with respect to yields:
The inequality follows from C 0 ; C 00 > 0: As l < h < 1; this implies a 1 (t) < a h (t) < a l (t).
Let us now determine the welfare-maximizing tax rate for a given technology. If the regulator knew that the …rm was using technology ; she would set the tax rate to minimize variable social cost, where (variable) social cost (V )SC (t) is given by (1):
with a (t) given by (22). Di¤erentiating with respect to t and using (22) implicitly de…nes the welfare-maximizing tax rate for a …rm with technology :
Totally di¤erentiating (26) with respect to and noting that a (t ) = a given by (2):
The inequality follows from D 00 > 0 and (3). Thus t 1 > t h > t l :
If …rm l invests and …rm h has technology ; = 1; h, the tax rate minimizes:
with V SC (t); = 1; h; l; given by (25). The …rst order condition is, using (1) and (22):
Lemma 5 t l < t hl < t h ; with t l and t h given by (26), and t hl by (29):
Commitment
With commitment, the regulator sets the tax rate t in stage one and the …rm chooses its technology in stage two. In stage three, which we have already analyzed in subsection 4.1, the …rm sets the abatement level a (t) given by (22).
For stage two, de…net (F ) and F (t) as the tax rate and the …xed cost level, respectively, that make …rm indi¤erent between the current and the new technology:
with a (t) given by (22).
Firm will adopt the new technology if and only if t >t (F ) or equivalently F < F (t).
Totally di¤erentiating (31) with respect to yields, using (22):
Thus, since F (t) = 0 in (31) for ! 1; and l < h < 1; we have
Totally di¤erentiating (31) with respect to t yields, using (22) and (24):
The inequality follows from (24).
Moving on to stage one, we can now state the equilibria for the whole game: 15 14 In the following, we will often writet (F ) simply ast : 15 In Appendix B we present the additional assumptions that guarantee that the second and third equilibria coexist.
Proposition 4 Let the regulator set the tax rate in stage one and the …rm make its investment decision in stage two. Let F h in (5) exceed F l in:
witht l ( F l ) given by (30). Then the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria are:
1. When 0 < F < F h (t hl ); with F h (t hl ) given by (31), the regulator sets t hl given by (29) and the …rm invests, irrespective of its type.
2. When F h (t hl ) < F < F h ; with F h given by
[with (V )SC (t) given by (25) andt h by (30)], the regulator setst h (F ) + " and the …rm invests, irrespective of its type.
3. When F h < F < F l (t 1l ); with F l (t 1l ) given by (31), the regulator sets t 1l given by (29) and only the …rm of type l invests.
4. When F l (t 1l ) < F < F l ; with F l given by (34), the regulator setst l (F ) + "; witht l (F )
given by (30) and only the …rm of type l invests.
5. When F l < F < F h ; the regulator setst l (F ) "; and the …rm does not invest.
Intuitively, when F is very low, both types of …rm will invest, and the regulator can set the optimal tax rate t hl given that both types invest (Proposition 4.1). When F gets higher, …rm h no longer wants to invest at t hl : Since the regulator still wants …rm h to invest, she sets the tax ratet h + " that just induces investment by …rm h (Proposition 4.2). For higher F; it is no longer optimal to induce …rm h to invest. The regulator will then set the tax rate t 1l which is optimal given that only …rm l invests (Proposition 4.3).
For even higher F; mirroring Proposition 4.2, …rm l no longer wants to invest at t 1l . Since the regulator still wants …rm l to invest, she sets the tax ratet l + " that just induces investment by …rm l (Proposition 4.4). Finally, for very high F; the regulator does not want …rm l to invest. She therefore sets the tax ratet l " that just discourages …rm l from investing (Proposition 4.5). 
Time consistency
With time consistency, the …rm chooses its technology in stage one and the regulator sets the tax rate t in stage two. In stage three, which we have already analyzed in subsection 4.1, the …rm sets its abatement level a (t) according to (22):
Let us start the analysis in stage two. As under quotas, let us label the ex post probability that the …rm is of type h as q: If the …rm has not invested, the regulator sets the tax rate at t 1 given by (26). If the …rm has invested and the regulator believes both types would have invested, then q = p and she sets the tax rate at t hl given by (29) . If the …rm has invested and the regulator believes only …rm l would have invested, then q = 0;
and she sets the tax rate at t l given by (26). We will assume that if the regulator believes neither type would have invested, she will set the tax rate at t l in the out-of-equilibrium event of investment.
In stage one, if …rm expects a tax rate of t hl upon investment; it will invest if:
Di¤erentiating with respect to yields dF Thus both types of …rm would invest when they expect a tax rate of t hl after investment. If the …rm expects t l after investment, again both types of …rm will invest. This is because obtaining a tax rate of t l < t hl (by Lemma 5) is even more attractive than a tax rate of t hl : There is then only one Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Proposition 5 Let the …rm make its investment decision in stage one and the regulator set the tax rate in stage two. In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the …rm invests, irrespective of its type, and the regulator sets the tax rate at t hl given by (29).
Comparing commitment and time consistency
Comparing the taxation equilibria under commitment (Proposition 4) and time consistency (Proposition 5), we …nd:
Proposition 6 Comparing the commitment and time consistency equilibria under emission taxation:
1. Time consistency always results in both types of …rm investing. With commitment, this only happens for F < F h given by (35): 2. When F < F h (t hl ) given by (29) and (31), commitment and time consistency result in the same outcome. When F > F h (t hl ); expected social cost is lower in the time consistency equilibrium, except possibly for F 2 F c ; F c where (31) and (29), and F l by (34).
Time consistency always leads to investment by both types of …rm, while commitment does not. Under time consistency, the …rm is rewarded for investment by a lower tax rate.
With commitment, the tax rate necessarily has to remain the same, whether the …rm invests or not. Since we have assumed (by setting F < F h ) that investment in the new technology is socially desirable, the higher investment incentive of time-consistent policy means that it usually results in higher welfare.
Comparing the instruments
In this section we shall compare emission taxation and emission quotas given that the policy scenario is either commitment or time consistency. In subsection 5.1, we compare the investment incentives that the instruments provide. In subsection 5.2, we compare the instruments on welfare, given that the abatement cost and environmental damage functions are quadratic.
Investment incentives
It follows from Propositions 1, 2, 4 and 5 that the comparison of the investment incentives from emission quotas and emission taxation depends crucially on the order of moves: Corollary 1.
With commitment, quotas always lead to investment, while taxation does not;
2. With time consistency, taxation always leads to investment, while quotas do not.
The second part of the corollary is the most straightforward to explain: taxation rewards investment, while quotas punish it. The regulator responds to the …rm's investment by setting a lower tax rate, but a tighter quota. Corollary 1.1 can be explained with the aid of Figure 4 . Let us …rst consider the …rm's investment incentives when the regulator knows the …rm is of type h. We shall focus on the equilibrium where the regulator sets the optimal policy, correctly expecting …rm h to invest. With quotas, she will then set a h given by (2): The …rm's abatement cost without investment is ORa h whereas with investment it is OHa h + F: The …rm will invest if F < F h (a h ) as de…ned in (7), which is ORH in Figure 4 : With taxation, the regulator sets t h given by (26): The …rm's total cost (abatement cost plus tax payment) without investment is OXt h e; whereas with investment it is OHt h e + F: The …rm will invest if F < F h (t h ) in (31) which is OXH in Figure 4 : We see that the incentive to invest under taxes is smaller than under targets, because OXH < ORH in Figure 4 .
Formally, note …rst that by (23), a h = a h (t h ) > a 1 (t h ): It then follows from (7) 
This inequality holds because C 0 [a 1 (t h )] = t h (by (22)) and C 00 > 0:
This …nding runs counter to the well-known textbook argument that taxes provide a larger investment incentive than quotas. 16 The argument there is that with quotas, investment only allows for the existing quota to be met at lower cost, while taxation gives the …rm the option to abate more and to save on the tax bill. The textbook argument assumes that the instruments are set such that they result in the same abatement level pre-investment. For ease of comparison, we shall take the target to be a 1 given by (2) and the tax rate as t 1 given by (26). 17 Then the …rm would invest under targets if F < F h (a 1 ) de…ned by (7), which is OBG in Figure 4 : The …rm would invest under taxes if F < F h (t 1 )
given by (31), which is OBN in Figure 4 . We see that OBN > OBG or by (7) and (31): Hanley et al. (2007, Figure 5.7, p. 162) . The …rst graphical exposition appears to be Downing and White (1986, Figure 2, p. 20) . 17 The argument is the same for any tax rate t and abatement target a 1 ( t) given by (22): The inequality follows from hC 0 [a h (t 1 )] = t 1 by (22), and C 00 > 0: Thus for a given pre-investment level of abatement, the investment incentive is higher with taxes.
Comparing the instruments for a given pre-investment level of abatement may make sense if it is assumed that the regulator is myopic, it takes time to change policy or the …rm is small. However, we are looking at the case of a welfare-maximizing regulator that can set the policy just before the …rm makes its investment decision. Also, we are focusing on the case of a large …rm whose abatement decision has a signi…cant impact on social welfare. In this case, if the regulator knows that the …rm is going to invest, she should set the instruments such that they result in optimal abatement post-investment. Now let us consider the e¤ect of asymmetric information, in which case there is a possibility that the …rm is not of type h; but of type l instead. Again we look at the case where the regulator sets the optimal policy, expecting the …rm to invest even if it has high costs. 18 With quotas, the regulator sets a m given by (10): Firm h will invest for F < F h (a m ) given by (7), which is OW J in Figure 4 : From (7),
or OW J > ORH because a m > a 1 by (4) and (11), and C 0 > 0: Thus, asymmetric information increases …rm h's investment incentive under quotas. With taxation, the regulator sets t hl given by (29), with t hl < t h by Lemma 5, and the …rm will invest for F < F h (t hl ) given by (31), which is OKS in Figure 4 : From (33) and Lemma 5,
Thus asymmetric information decreases …rm h's investment incentive under taxes.
We have found that under perfect information, quotas give more incentive to invest than taxes. Asymmetric information increases the investment incentive for quotas and decreases it for taxes. Thus asymmetric information makes the investment incentive gap even larger in favour of quotas.
Welfare
In this subsection, we compare welfare under quotas and emission taxation, given that the policy scenario is either commitment or time consistency. To achieve readable insights, we will assume that both abatement costs and environmental damages are quadratic.
First let us consider the case where both types of …rm invest in the new technology and the regulator sets environmental policy optimally, given that they invest. This can occur under commitment as well as with time consistency.
Lemma 7 Let the …rm of type ; = h; l; have variable abatement costs C(a) where C 0 (a) is linear with its slope normalized to 1. Let marginal damage D 0 (e a) be a linear function with slope d: Consider the case where both types of …rm invest in the new technology and the regulator sets environmental policy optimally, given that they invest. That is, with emission quotas, the regulator sets the abatement target a m given by (10) and with emission taxes, she sets t hl given by (29).
1. Expected social cost is higher under taxes than under quotas if and only if:
2. This inequality always holds as F we still …nd that the comparison depends on the relative slopes of the M AC and M ED curves. However, condition (37) features a "reverse" probability weighting: the slope of …rm l's M AC curve is weighted with the probability that the …rm is of type h; and vice versa. Weitzman (1974, fn. p. 486; and Malcomson (1978) have previously analyzed multiplicative uncertainty, but without deriving reverse probability weighting. (2015), the reverse probability rule is all that is needed for the welfare comparison between the price and the quantity instrument under commitment. In the present paper, by contrast, the reverse probability rule only applies when the …rm invests under both instruments.
In order to understand the reverse probability weighting, let us suppose the regulator is practically certain that the …rm is of type h: She would then set the abatement target at a h and the tax rate at t h : If, against all expectations, the …rm is of type l; then the related welfare loss depends on the slope of the M AC curve in the unlikely scenario that the …rm is of type l.
Lemma 7.2 shows that quotas are better than taxes when both types invest, since (37) always holds as F h l > 0: F h l is …rm h's gain from investing under time consistency when the regulator sets the quota at a l after investment. In Figure 1 , F h l is given by the area OBG a 1 GY a l : Note that the ‡atter the M AC h curve, the larger the area OBG and the smaller a 1 GY a l : In Figure 1 , OBG is larger than a 1 GY a l ; which requires M AC h to be quite ‡at. Indeed, it has to be ‡atter than the M ED curve. If M ED is steeper than M AC h ; it is also steeper than any weighted average of M AC h and M AC l .
We now turn to comparing the instruments under commitment more generally. For quotas, the equilibrium described in Lemma 7 is the unique equilibrium (Proposition 1).
For taxation, there are many equilibria (Proposition 4), but the equilibrium described in Lemma 7 generally has the lowest expected social cost of them all (Propositions 4 and 6.2). Using Lemma 7 we can then state:
Proposition 7 Let marginal abatement cost C 0 (a) and marginal damage D 0 (e a) be linear functions. Let the regulator set either the emission quota target or the emission tax rate in stage one and let the …rm make its investment decision in stage two. Then, given that F < F h l in (15), expected social cost is lower with quotas than with taxes, except possibly except possibly for F 2 F t ; F t where F h < F t < F l (t 1l ) < F t < F l ; with F h given by (35), F l (t 1l ) by (31) and (29), and F l by (34).
The generally better performance of quotas is due to two factors. First, quotas o¤er higher investment incentives (Corollary 1.1), and investment is socially desirable. Secondly, where quotas and emission taxation both result in investment, quotas have lower expected social costs (Lemma 7).
The welfare comparison of quotas and emission taxation under time consistency is ambiguous, even if we assume quadratic abatement cost and environmental damage functions. On the one hand, taxation has the advantage of always resulting in investment by both types of …rm (Corollary 1.2). On the other hand, however, taxation results in higher expected social costs when both instruments result in investment (Lemma 7). Even when both types of …rm invest under taxation and they do not under quotas, taxation may still result in higher expected social costs.
Conclusion
The incentives provided for the adoption of cleaner technologies are a signi…cant dimension when dealing with the design of environmental policy. The regulatory framework can be particularly complicated when the technology in question is relatively new, so that the regulator herself might not possess all the relevant information. We model such a situation by assuming that when the …rm invests, the environmental authority cannot observe whether the regulated …rm is e¢ cient or ine¢ cient in using the adopted technology. We address the performance of environmental quotas and emission taxes under two institutional settings, commitment and time consistency. With commitment (time consistency), the regulator sets environmental policy before (after) the …rm has made its investment decision.
Like the present paper, D'Amato and Dijkstra (2015) [henceforth AD15] compare emission taxation and quantity regulation (emission quotas in the present paper, tradable emission permits in AD15) under commitment and time consistency when …rms can choose between the current and a new abatement technology and abatement costs with the new technology are either high or low. When comparing our results to AD15, we should bear in mind the di¤erences in setup between the two papers. In AD15 there is a continuum of small …rms, and the …rst best is for some, but not all, …rms to invest in the new technology.
The present paper features only one …rm, and the …rst best is for this …rm to invest, even if it has high costs.
It is also worth noting that previous papers have already found di¤erences between the single-…rm and the many-…rm case under full information. With many heterogeneous …rms, both taxation and tradeable permits implement the …rst best under commitment and time consistency (Requate and Unold, 2001) . With a single …rm, the only scenario where the …rst best is always implemented is with an emission quota under commitment (Amacher and Malik, 2001 ).
When there is asymmetric information in the single-…rm (the present paper) or the multi-…rm (AD15) case, the …rst best cannot be implemented under commitment, because the regulator cannot …nd out whether costs are high or low. The welfare comparison between the two instruments is guided by the reverse probability-weighted Weitzman rule in both cases (although in the present paper this only applies if the …rm invests under both instruments).
The big di¤erence between the papers occurs under time consistency, where both instruments implement the …rst best in AD15, but neither instrument achieves this in the present paper. In AD15, the regulator can infer the cost realization from the number of …rms that invest in the new technology, and each …rm takes the regulator's beliefs and policy as given when it makes its investment decision. As a result, asymmetric information is no obstacle to reaching the …rst best. The present paper shows that with asymmetric information the regulator cannot implement the …rst best in the single-…rm case even when it was possible to do so with complete information. This is because the regulator can only see the investment decision by the single …rm. If both types of …rm invest, as they should in the …rst best, the regulator cannot infer the …rm's type from its investment decision. Firms can signal their type through their investment decision. However, this signal is of a much lower quality with a single than with many …rms.
Our paper sheds new light on the complexity of environmental policy design under asymmetric information about the e¤ectiveness of a new abatement technology. There is no one-size-…ts-all solution: the choice of the best instrument depends on the ability of the regulator to commit. Although the regulator can never reach the …rst best, we can still compare investment incentives and welfare under the two instruments, with some surprising results.
Our results are obtained in a very simple setting where, in particular, asymmetric information is modeled assuming only two possible e¢ ciency levels in the use of the newly adopted technology, and only one …rm is subject to regulation, yet marginal damage is increasing. This implies that some issues, mainly linked to …rm heterogeneity and to the possibility of asymmetric choices, cannot be analysed and are left for future research. Yet we can show that the ordering of commitment and time consistency is crucially a¤ected by the chosen environmental policy instrument and vice versa. Our analysis is policy relevant, as we assess how informational asymmetries related to a newly crafted technology a¤ect the adoption patterns when the regulator can gain information on the regulated …rm's costs by being time (in)consistent.
In order to limit the number of cases to be analyzed, we have assumed that investment is always socially desirable. We have also abstracted from the positive spillovers that the …rm's investment could have in the form of knowledge and adoption externalities (Ja¤e et al. (2003), pp. 471-474; Ja¤e et al. (2005) ). These positive externalities would change the regulator's behaviour under commitment. The regulator might want to set a stricter target or a higher tax rate in order to nudge the …rm towards investment, thereby generating positive spillovers. The regulator's behaviour under time consistency would remain the same, because here she sets policy after the …rm has made its investment decision. Taking these positive externalities into account, the …rm's investment might well have the potential to improve overall social welfare, even if it has a negative e¤ect on the sum of its own abatement costs and pollution damage. However, modeling this explicitly would lead to a further proliferation of cases to be analyzed. We leave this for future research.
A Appendix A: Proofs Lemma 1. Recall that a ; = l; h; 1; is de…ned by (2). For any a a l (with the new or the current technology), normalize the …rm's payment T to the regulator to zero. For any a with a h a < a l (again regardless of the technology choice), the …rm pays T with
For any a with 0 a < a h and investment in the new technology, the …rm paysT witĥ
For any a with 0 a < a h without investment in the new technology, the …rm pays T with T > T + hC(a h ) + F: The …rm will then invest, regardless of its type, and …rm will abate a :
Lemma 2. The lemma holds if and only if F < F h (a m ) as given by (7) and (10). We …nd from (5) and (7):
The …rst inequality follows from (11) and C 0 > 0: The second inequality follows from the fact that a 1 minimizes SC 1 : Since we have assumed that F < F h ; we also have F < F h (a m ); and both types of …rm will invest when the abatement target is a m :
Lemma 3. We see from (8) and (12) 
First, de…ne a 1m > a 1 implicitly by SC 1 ( a 1m ) = SC h (a m ); or using (5) for F = F h :
We shall now see that a 1m < a m : Suppose that a 1m a m : Then we can write the LHS of (A1) as:
The …rst term between square brackets on the RHS is nonnegative, because a 1m a m > a 1 (the second inequality follows from (3) and m < 1) and SC 0 1 (a) > 0 for a > a 1 :
The third term between square brackets on the RHS of (A2) is positive, because a 1 minimizes SC 1 (a): Thus we have:
Comparing the RHS of (A3) to the RHS of (A1) yields:
The inequality follows from h < 1; (11) and C 0 > 0: It follows from (A3) and (A4) that a 1m a m cannot hold. Thus a 1m < a m :
We can now write:
The equality follows from (A1) and F = F h in (5). The inequality follows from a 1m < a m ; which implies a 1m < a 1l < a m : Then SC 1 ( a 1m ) < SC 1 (a 1l ) since a 1 < a 1m < a 1l
and SC 0 1 (a) > 0 for a > a 1 ; and SC l (a m ) < SC 1 (a 1l ) since a l > a m > a 1l and SC 0 l (a) < 0 for a < a l :
Since the second term in square brackets in the …rst line of (A5) cancels out against the corresponding term in the last line by (5) with F = F h , the Lemma follows. 
We thus need to prove that F h h < F l l which implies from (15) and (A6):
Since F l l > 0 in (15) so that C(a 1 ) > lC(a l ) > 0; and also l < 1, lC(a l ) must be on the increasing branch of C(a ): l < e by Assumption 1. Then if h is between l and e ; it is also on the increasing branch and (A7) holds. If h is between e and 1; it is on the decreasing branch of e C(a ); so that hC(a h ) > C(a 1 ) > lC(a l ) and (A7) also holds. (29) is negative and the second term is nonpositive. This, combined with (23) means that the LHS of (29) is positive, so that (29) cannot hold. In the same way, we can show that t hl < t h :
Proposition 4. In the …rst equilibrium, for very low values of F , in stage one the regulator sets the optimal tax rate of t hl (de…ned by (29)), given that both types of …rm will invest, and in stage two both types of …rm invest. At t hl ; …rm h will invest for all F < F h (t hl ) given by (31): As we have seen following (32), F h (t hl ) > 0:
In the second equilibrium, while …rm h would no longer invest at t hl ; the regulator would still like to induce it to invest. Thus the regulator sets the tax rate att h (F ) + "; witht h (F ) given by (30).
As F keeps rising, there comes a point at which the regulator prefers to see only …rm l investing. In the third equilibrium the regulator sets the optimal tax rate of t 1l (de…ned by (29), given that …rm l will invest, but …rm h will not. At F = F h in (35), the regulator is indi¤erent between the second and the third equilibrium:
When F grows larger, it will reach F l (t 1l ); de…ned by (31) as the point beyond which …rm l no longer wants to invest at tax rate t 1l : However, in the fourth equilibrium, the regulator still induces …rm l to invest by setting the tax rate att l (F ) + "; witht l (F ) given by (30).
For even higher F; the regulator no longer wishes …rm l to invest. When neither type of …rm invests, the regulator would ideally like to set the tax rate at t 1 : However, if in stage one the regulator sets t 1 , …rm h will invest in stage two. Figure 3 illustrates this: Firm h invests at t 1 for F < F h (t 1 ) = OBN; which exceeds the maximum F of F h = OBH.
Formally, comparing F h (t 1 ) to F h in (5), we …nd:
The …rst term in curly brackets on the RHS is positive by (4), t 1 = D 0 (e a 1 ) by (26) and D 00 > 0: This term is given by area BV H in Figure 3 . The second term in curly brackets is positive because a h (t 1 ) > a h (t h ) = a h as t 1 > t h by (27) and by (23), hC 0 [a h (t 1 )] = t 1 by (22) and C 00 > 0: This term is given by area V N H in Figure 3 .
Since setting the tax rate at t 1 would not have the desired result, the …fth equilibrium features the regulator setting the tax rate as high as possible, while still discouraging …rm l from investing. This means the tax rate will bet l (F ) "; witht l (F ) given by (30).
We have de…ned F l in (34) as the level of …xed cost at which the regulator is indi¤erent between inducing …rm l to invest and discouraging investment. We have assumed F l < F h ; in order for all …ve equilibria to occur for F 2 (0; F h ):
Lemma 6. From (5) and (36) we …nd:
The …rst term in curly brackets is positive because t 1 > t h > t hl by (27) and Lemma 5: This is area V t 1 t hl X in Figure 3 . The second term is positive by (4), t h = D 0 (e a h )
in (26), D 00 > 0 and t 1 > t h by (27): This is area BV H in Figure 3 . The third term is positive because t h > t hl by Lemma 5; a h = a h (t h ) > a h (t hl ) by (23), (26) and C 00 > 0:
This is area ZHX in Figure 3 .
Proposition 6. The …rst commitment equilibrium listed in Proposition 4 is the same as the only equilibrium under time consistency (Proposition 5) and thus yields the same expected social costs. The second equilibrium under commitment yields higher expected social costs than this, because while both equilibria have both types of …rm investing, t hl is the optimal tax rate given that they do. At F = F h under commitment; the regulator is indi¤erent between the tax rates oft h + " (the second equilibrium) and t 1l (the third equilibrium). Thus by continuity, the third equilibrium under commitment also yields higher expected social costs than the time consistency equilibrium for F close to the lower bound of F h . For F close to the higher bound of F l (t 1l ) however, social costs could be lower under commitment. 20 Sincet l [F l (t 1l )] = t 1l ; social cost could also be lower in the fourth commitment equilibrium for F close to the lower bound of F l (t 1l ): However, at the higher bound of F = F l ; social cost is higher in commitment. This is because in the …fth 20 In Appendix B, we use a quadratic speci…cation to show that it is indeed possible for social costs to be lower under commitment for F = F l (t 1l ). commitment equilibrium, social cost is higher under commitment:
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that t 1 minimizes social cost, given that the …rm does not invest. The second inequality follows from F < F h in (5). The third inequality follows from the fact that E [SC hl (t hl )] is decreasing in l with l < h: given by:
The corresponding expected social costs are:
From (22), the …rm with technology responds to a tax rate of t by setting:
From (29), the …rst order condition for social cost minimization with respect to t implies:
The corresponding (minimum) expected social costs at t hl are:
E [SC hl (t hl )] = F + 1 2 de 2 dp(1 p) (h l)
The di¤erential gain in favour of quotas is, from (A9) and (A12): As for the third equilibrium, the switch fromt h to t 1l at F h can only occur when …rm h will not invest, but …rm l will. We shall assume that this is the case:
Assumption 3.t l ( F h ) < t 1l <t h ( F h ); with t (F ) given by (30), F h by (35), and t 1l by (29).
